/389 cont./

162
463

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 11.6% | in the primary sector, | |
| | of whom: agriculturalists | 10.9% |
| 44.5% | in the secondary sector, | |
| | of whom: unskilled workers | 0.7% |
| | skilled workers in construction | 10% |
| | skilled modern workers | 14.6% |
| | staffs and supervisors | 1.1% |
| 41.9% | in the tertiary sector, | |
| | of whom: domestics | 2.7% |
| | commerce, transport and repair | 11.4% |
| | sweepers, orderlies, porters | 1.6% |
| | unskilled office employees | 3.3% |
| | skilled office employees | 1.8% |
| | highly skilled office employees and administrative staffs | 1.1% |
| | public force | 16.4% (1) |

●[113]

1. This information is taken from the publication drawn up by the Service de la statistique générale du Haut Commissariat de l'A.O.F., "Commune mixte de Thiès.

/389 cont./

162
463
[113]

Recensement 1953 /The mixed commune of Thiès. 1953 Census/," Dakar, 1954. We have only converted into percentages the figures given on pp. 25 ff. of this pamphlet.

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114

By its very diversity, this population thus constitutes an excellent field of study and experiment for the sociologist and the economist.

A socio-demographic inquiry by questionnaire was made previously, in November and December 1953. The sample chosen contained 900 heads of families questioned (2). We

2. The results of this inquiry, which was supervised by Dr. Massé, will be published in the next issue of this Bulletin.

wished to complete it partially by studying some family budgets in a very limited number, 46, three of which proved to be useless.

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Under no pretext should any general value be given to the results that are going to be presented. The trends shown will have to be confirmed by other, more extensive inquiries, in conformity with the resolution adopted in 1926 by the Third Conference of the Statisticiens du travail, which specified: "it is better to give up certain details which the inquiry might reveal than to reduce the number of families studied."

/390/ We have almost systematically taken a course opposite to this recommendation, because the information now available on the daily life of the Africans in the cities of Senegal (and in French West Africa in its totality) is still too insufficient for one to be able to undertake broader inquiries. On the other hand, and this was a major obstacle, we did not have at our disposal sufficient means to study a larger number of families. This has saved us from the temptation of looking too far; daily African life is at this point complex, particularly in its economic aspect, so that in certain respects the work accomplished and the documents

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

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5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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113 *Présence Africaine*, Paris, bi-monthly since 1947.
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6: Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37



The reason is not to be sought solely in the increase in numbers of this intellectual elite though that was quite substantial. Trained in Europe and remaining in touch with the world outside, it was the first section of the population to become consciously aware of the 'colonial situation',[1] and it immediately made an attempt to build up ideological systems which soon acquired crucial influence. Next, the changed pattern in the relations between Europeans and Africans speeded up the development of situations in which conflicts became inevitable, and encouraged the maintenance of close contact between the new and the colonial elites. I shall revert to this point later. True, tension existed, especially between generations, the older strata of the colonial elite having sometimes to defend the positions they had won.[2] But the younger people tended to identify themselves with the new elite, to accept its guidance and to share, more or less confusedly, in the same awakening to the colonial situation. Thus, the intellectual elite, in the broadest sense of the term, embarked in a new direction, and the political consequences of this change are now beginning to be seen. The problem of relations with the workers' elite which has emerged in the past few years is more complex; I shall come back to it in connexion with trade union activity.

In the typical pre-war situation, the African elite had little chance of competing with the European managing class, which was much less numerous that it is now.[3] It was trained to be what might be called an auxiliary elite. The new elite, on the contrary—notwithstanding the administrative and economic expansion of the past 10 years—will inevitably find itself in competition with Europeans in the managing and supervisory grades in an ever growing number of specific cases. Though still few in numbers, it has difficulty in finding a place in the territory's administrative and technological machine. It is a paradox that in a country immensely in need of responsible personnel, both managers and technicians, demand seems somewhat to exceed supply. In French West Africa, and particularly in Senegal, the government officially recognizes the existence of an 'employment problem for holders of diplomas'. One of the causes of this situation is no doubt the total absence of planning in the training of elites.[4] But the real explanation must be found in political circumstances and race relations.[5] The effort to 'Africanize' the upper grades encounters firm resistance, and so the rise of the elites is apparently seriously checked by the growing number of situations in which Africans and Europeans compete and which the two groups explain in diametrically opposite ways.[6] It is a significant fact that several Senegalese who have completed their studies in France have remained there, because they would be unable to find jobs for which they could apply at home. The problem is obviously even more acute in the private sector than in the administration.[7] Also, the European population has considerably increased in the past 10 years:[8] it has more than doubled in Senegal, tripled at Dakar—where it now represents about 10 per cent of the population.

1. Cf. the studies of G. Balandier, and in particular: *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique Noire* (Present sociology of Negro Africa), Paris, 1955.
2. Especially in the administration.
3. Cf. P. Mercier, 'Le Groupement Européen de Dakar: Orientations d'une Enquête' (The European group at Dakar: Suggested lines for a survey), *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XIX, 1955.
4. An effort is now being made in this direction.
5. Cf. P. Mercier, 'Le Groupement Européen de Dakar . .', op. cit.
6. Patterns of thought based on the pre-war situation play a fundamental role here.
7. Where the trend, as yet timid, towards 'Africanization' of the upper grades can be discerned.
8. A general phenomenon in French West Africa which involves important changes in relations between Africans and Europeans.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

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178 571 masses, it found in the 'colonial elite' the go-between it needed for the resumption of contact to which it aspired.

The activity of this new elite is beginning to be discernible in its political and trade union work, and its basic aspirations can be defined. As has already been said, a Western-type political life was introduced fairly early in one part of Senegal. Political parties were formed; after 1946, their influence extended throughout the territory. In a recent paper[1] we stated that they had become, in the 'four communes', an almost traditional part of the social system. Once they reached the whole of Senegal, they acquired an enormous body of followers, the divisions among whom reflected successively—or simultaneously, according to the district—a number of historical, social, ethnic and family rifts. Thus, the antagonism between the Socialist party and the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, which has been a salient factor over recent years, did but reproduce according to time and place, the antagonism between former 'citizens' and former 'subjects', Ouolof and non-Ouolof, Moslems and Catholics, one Moslem sect and another, etc. On the whole, the 'colonial elite' has assumed the leadership of these parties.[2] But recent surveys have shown that, in the urban centres at any rate, membership in a political party might be commoner among the illiterate elements than among the 'educated'. This is a clear indication of the gap between the political parties and the present ambitions of the elites. A strongly held local position or the prestige of certain leaders is the reason why the traditional parties, though ill adapted to the present situation, have succeeded in keeping afloat. However, the waning influence of the Socialist party (the oldest organized party) was the sign after 1950 of the start of a new phase. The young elite from the liberal professions, followed by numerous young members of the 'colonial elite', remained markedly aloof from these movements, which seemed to efford no opportunity for the political action in which they intended to engage. Their sympathies went to a movement of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain type, although they were unable to impose it because of the strong positions held by the traditional parties. Yet some of the more influential members of this young elite finally decided to join the Senegalese party which seemed to have the strongest hold over the popular masses, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.[3] There, they will doubtless play an important role. The point has been reached at which the new elite is seeking to take over the torch from the 'colonial elite', but with political ambitions of a much more radical nature; I shall consider later the ideological aspects of the problem. In the case of the trade unions, the position is slightly different. Their activity,[4] of recent origin, soon acquired deeper significance. The more energetic elements of the 'administrative bourgeoisie', in alliance with the still small working-class elite, embarked in the trade unions on a course of action which was more directly effective than that of the political parties.[5] The climate of thought, directly or indirectly influenced by theories of Marxist origin, favoured the growth of an awareness of the 'colonial situation'. In this respect, however, the new intellectual elite played

665 178 571

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460 178 571

[13]

1. Cf. P. Mercier, *An Experimental Investigation conducted by means of Questionnaires in the town of Dakar*, report presented to the Conference on the Social Impact of Industrialization and Urban Problems, organized by Unesco at Abidjan, 1954.
2. As have, needless to say, certain members of an elite formed from the liberal professions, which had already emerged before the war.
3. In which they represent the 'left' wing.
4. Most of the unions are affiliated to the trade union federations in France.
5. And more resolutely modernist in its outlook.

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

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[P 3 D]

[1] An instrumental distinction whose meaning is explained below. For an examination of some criteria making possible the definition of different types of colonial cities, *cf.* P. Mercier, "Aspects de la société africaine dans l'agglomération dakaroise: groupes familiaux et unités de voisinage," in *L'agglomération dakaroise. Quelques aspects sociologiques et démographiques*, I.F.A.N., Dakar, 1954.

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[P. 4C]
[Footnote 4 continued on P5C-Analyst]

[2] Their territory, at least in the case of the oldest cities, was often the object of a "concession" by local authorities, and was therefore withdrawn from their direct control.

[3] This is the case, for example, of Lagos; regarding Dakar, where the authorities of the "Republic of Lebou" had their seat, *cf.* C. Michel, "L'organisation coutumière (sociale et politique) de la communauté Laboue de Dakar," *Bull. du Comité d'Et. hist. et sci. de l'A.O.F.*, March 17, 1934; and C. Faure, *Histoire de la presqu'île du Cap-Vert et des origins de Dakar*, Paris, 1914.

[4] G. Balandier, in *Sociologie des Brazzavilles noires* (Paris, 1955) shows clearly the occurrence there of "a transfer onto an urban milieu of leadership agencies already existing in a rural milieu: the

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633
[113]
642

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[p.5c]

hierarchy of administrator-mayor, administrator-deputy mayor, and ward leader corresponds to the hierarchy of regional leader, district leader, and cantonal leader" (p. 169). The contradictions that he points out in the administrative organization of Brazzaville were sharper still at Dakar: the institution of appointed ward leaders coexisted with that of an elected city government, whose relations with the colonial administration did not differ in principle from those of French city governments with prefectoral authority.

[5] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56).

Groupement européen de Dakar: orientations d'une enquête," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.* XIX, 1955.

[6] *Cf. Infra.*, and the Summary Notes Given in P. Mercier, "Aspects de la Société Africaine" and "Le

[7] *Cf.* B. G. M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, London, 1948; and G. Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire*, Paris, 1955.

643 633 369 [113]

/12 cont./

present, limited to the Dakar agglomeration proper; the suburbs more or less completely tied to the town have been provisionally left aside (Ouakam, Hann, the recent subdivision of Dagoudane-Pikine, etc.).

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I

Dakar has known enormous development between the two wars, and especially since 1946. Demographic development, economic development (3).

369x

3. Cf., for example, the accounts of an American geographer after two voyages to Dakar, one before the war (1935-36), the other in 1947: D. Whittlesey, "Dakar and the Other Cape Verde Settlements," The Geographical Review, Oct. 1941, pp. 609-638; "Dakar Revisited," The Geographical Review, Oct. 1948, pp. 626-632. And the changes have accelerated even more.

[113]

At the same time, the characteristics of Dakar society, it being well understood that it is broken up into several partial societies, linked organically, but each of which have their particular problems, have undergone important changes. To account for them would exceed the limits of this work; we shall content ourselves with recalling some essential features.

A. -- The towns born of colonization have been established [361]

17: Mercier
369

MS37 Senegal MS37

/For a study of aspects of African society in the agglomeration of Dakar: family groups and neighborhood units, see category 116, pp. 2-57./

17: Mercier--7 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37 ●
Dakar
Wolof MS30
Lebu

/14 cont./ S 369x 563

(occupational structure, class structure, etc.). It seems that there are certain numerical thresholds beyond which important qualitative changes make themselves felt, for example, in the area of race relations. We shall return to this.

B. -- Dakar is one of the most complex cases. It has some aspects of an old colonial town, and in fact it is one of the oldest in West Africa (2). But this one has been

2. Counting only the colonial towns; the pre-European towns, with specific characteristics, are excluded here.

covered in a way by a town of the second type (3). The

3. Cf. above, I, A, 1, b.

mixture of the social characteristics of the one town and of the other permits one to understand certain features of evolution of Dakar. On the other hand, the dominant original ethnic group, the Lebou group, has progressively lost its importance. Finally, a last phase of the development of the town makes it seem like a center of European population, still unstable. S 369x 563 W 369 563

1. Considering only the African population, one ascertains that the elements that are old and stabilized -- unequally and under diverse conditions -- (Goréean "old families," Lebou community) have been submerged by a heterogeneous mass. It is nevertheless necessary to specify:

a) The Lebou, despite the contributions received from the nearby suburb which is their traditional habitat zone (4), undoubtedly represent hardly more than 10% of S W [162] [113] ●

4. Cf. G. Balandier and P. Mercier, "Particularisme et évolution: les pêcheurs

17: Mercier--8 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar
Wolof MS90
Lebu
S
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W
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W
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[113]
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/14 cont./

Lebou /Particularism and evolution: the Lebou Fishermen/," Etudes Sénégalaises, No. 3, 1952. Result of investigations made in 1946.

the population. (5). Their /15/ customary organization,

5. The estimates, furnished by the way with every reservation by the Dakar Délégation, give 15% Lebou, but for the whole of the commune (suburban villages included); in the town itself the proportion is not as high. We consider only this one, without forgetting, however, that many Lebou living in the villages, and even Rufisque, work in Dakar. In the investigation by questionnaires conducted in Dakar, which gives, if not a true ethnic representation, at least some valuable indications, we encountered a little less than 10% Lebou.

S
W
[484]

moreover, continues to exist (1), but becomes more and

1. On this subject, cf. C. Michel, "L'organisation coutumière (sociale et politique) de la collectivité Leboue de Dakar /The customary organization (social and political) of the Lebou community of Dakar/," Bull. du Comité d'Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l'A.O.F., XXII,

S
W
[113]

17: Mercier--9 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar
Wolof MS90
Lebu
S
369x
369
S
W
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[113]

/15 cont./

3, 1934; G.-J. Duchemin, "La République Lebou et le peuplement actuel /The Lebou republic and the present pupulation/," in "La presqu'île du Cap-Vert /The Cape Verde peninsula/," Etudes Sénégalaises, No. 1, 1949.

more formal, and its efficacy is reduced besides by the new political cleavages (2). Their role as holders of the landed

2. This goes as far as a splitting up of the traditional functions and those of the heads of quarters between the supporters of the two large present-day parties (SFIO and BDS).

property has progressively shrunk and remains important only in the suburbs (3). Finally, the Lebou particularism (4)

3. On this subject cf. the indications furnished by J. Dresch, op. cit., pp. 219-220.

4. Cf. G. Balandier and P. Mercier, op. cit., passim.

is tending to be obliterated, and the boundaries between Lebou and Wolof become more blurred (5).

5. In the figures furnished by the Dakar Délégation, one sees accounting for 11% a category

S
W
[162]

/17 cont./ 369x 563 162 [167]

-- persons originally from French Guinea: Malinké (3%), Peul, Soussou, Kissi;

-- persons from the Ivory Coast: Agni, Appollonien, Attié, Baoulé /Baule/, Bété /Betie/, Dida, Krou, Wobé;

-- persons originally from the Togo-Dahomey zone: Aizo, Ewe, Fon, Goun /Gun/, Nago, Popo, Mina;

-- persons originally from the Upper Volta-Niger zone: Mossi, Sonray;

-- miscellaneous: Moors (3%), Cape Verdeans (2%), Yoruba, Boulama, Congolese, etc.

Those for whom we have indicated no percentage are for the most part of little importance numerically in relation to the total population. Their situation, however, is very variable: the consequences of uprooting, the degree of cohesion which preserves small groups very far from their region of origin, the degree of integration in the urban society, vary according to the level at which they are located in the new social stratification which takes shape in the towns.

3. Indeed, another feature of the sociology of colonial towns -- and which is, as we mentioned above, very conspicuous in the "old towns" -- is the progressive differentiation into strata definable by socio-occupational criteria. It assumes, as the investigation on Dakar showed, a /18/ greater and greater importance in the stabilized population; there, the domains where behavior continues to be determined by the ethnic, religious, etc. situation are limited. We posed the problem in this manner in a recent article, to which we allow ourselves to refer (1): "It appears ... that our categories only 369x 565

1. P. Mercier, "Un essai d'enquête par questionnaires dans la ville de Dakar /An attempt at investigation by questionnaires in the town of Dakar/" (Paper given at the conference on the Consequences of Industrialization [113]

17: Mercier--15 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar

/18 cont./

and Urbanization in Africa, Abidjan, 1954). 369x 565 [113]

tendentially have the character of social classes. They are distinguished by the living standard and way of life and by a certain number of specific behaviors, but the characteristics of colonial society, on the one hand, and, on the other, the persistence of traditional values do not permit them to assume the character of clear-cut classes." We shall return to this account, where we noted the absence of close correlations [182] between socio-occupational category, ethnic group, and religion, but, on the other hand, the existence of very clear correlations between the socio-occupational categories and facts such as level of French studies, the importance of intermarriages between different ethnic groups, that of the role played by the groupings and associations of a new type (political parties, syndicates, etc.). Also the ethnic affiliation plays a role of variable importance, although it is very rarely obliterated completely.

4. The new structures which characterize the towns give a large place to grouping of a political, syndical, cultural, sportive, etc. order. We shall not discuss this problem here. It must be noted, however, that in Dakar the importance of some of them is considerably reinforced by the function that Dakar performs as the federal capital; it is valid for the syndicates and to a lesser degree for the political parties. 369x 571

5. Finally, an important fact in every colonial town, but particularly in Dakar is the juxtaposition of racially and culturally different groups. For Dakar, the European population undoubtedly represents 10% of the total population (2), and 369x 563 162

2. In the census of the non-autochthonous population of 1951, close to 22,000.

/5/

244 433 Since the "campaign" of 1959-60, the commercial production of groundnuts in Senegal has reached 720,000 metric tons of groundnuts in the shell. In 1957-58, there was a record year with 830,000 metric tons. Since for these recent years the total production of food products can be estimated at about 550,000 metric tons, the proportion of 1,800 kilograms of groundnuts harvested per metric ton of food products, advanced in 1951 by M. Portères, is very close to the Senegalese economic reality (1).

[113]

1. For this information we have consulted: Barbier, J., "L'économie de l'arachide au Sénégal, Contribution à l'Étude du marché français des huiles alimentaires /The economy of the groundnut in Senegal, Contribution to the study of the French marketing of food oils/," typewritten thesis for the doctorate in law, Lille, 20 May 1960, 475 pp.

A.O.F. 57: Tableaux économiques /French West Africa 57: Economic Tables/. Haut-Commissariat de la République en A.O.F. Direction des Services économiques et du plan, 412 pp.

Outre-Mer 58: Service statistique d'Outre-Mer /Oversea 58: Oversea Statistical Service/, P.U.F. 1960.

177 244 The groundnut is originally from America; Jean de Léry, a French clergyman, described this plant around 1855, under the name of "manoki," as a crop of the region of Rio. In the seventeenth century Père Plumier noted it for the Antilles. The Portuguese slave-dealers seem to have imported it to Africa around the middle of the sixteenth century. The natives of Senegambia were soon cultivating it around their huts, and as

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generally at the end of October or the beginning of November. Harvesting is done by cutting the stalks with the hilaire four or five centimeters under the ground. They are collected into little piles, sometimes protected by a shelter of plant material for drying, and then heaped into stacks to await the detachment of the shells several weeks later by threshing or by hand. This last operation is entrusted to the women and children. All of these tasks require great effort, and the more so since during the same brief period one must busy himself with the food crops, millet, niébés /Vigna/, etc.

The ways in which the groundnut is associated with the food crops are quite variable and put their mark on the agrarian landscape.

1) The lougan of the Ouoloff peasant. The Ouoloff peasant of Cayor or of Siné-Saloum represents the most traditional type of cultivator of groundnuts. He still practices shifting cultivation on his lougan /cultivated field/ cleared by fire in the open bush. Although he does practice a millet-groundnut rotation, often with very little strictness, he does not know the virtues of fertilization. He cultivates the soil until it is exhausted and then abandons it for 15 or 20 years, which allows it to go back to bush. Today, however, demographic pressure does not always permit him to dispose of the vast areas of land required for this long rest. The soil is rapidly being exhausted; the yields are diminishing. In Cayor the latter have fallen off at least 700 kilograms per hectare. The cultivation of the groundnut is very obviously regressing.

2) The organized ground of the Sérère /Serer/ peasantry (2). The Sérère are a group of Sudanese origin, driven back

2. Pelissier, P. "Les paysans sérère, essai sur la formation d'un terroir au Sénégal /The Serer peasants, an essay on the formation of a ground in Senegal/," Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, Vol. VI, 1953, No. 22, pp. 105-127.

S
SR /7 cont./
241 by the Mandingue and settled in Siné-Saloum. They are above
[244] all millet farmers; on the average they cultivate a hectare of this cereal to 70 acres of groundnuts. The groundnut, having entered the agricultural cycle quite recently, has contributed to the formation of a ground of specialized sectors. Around the village, surrounding it, are located the fields of small millet, cotton, and manioc. Beyond this pombod, under the Faidherbia, the ground is divided into three areas /soles/ corresponding to a system of triennial rotation, small millet, groundnuts, and fallowing, where, after cultivation, the animals graze and manure the soil for the next cultivation. Each family has its shares in each /8/ /Fig. 1 appears here/ area.
SR
[423] The separation between these three large sectors of the ground is maintained by living hedges or barriers of cut thorns. In Sérère country a permanent ground is delineated, and land ownership stands out. The peasant takes care of managing the land and only wants a little money for the groundnuts, a secondary crop.

S
244 3) "Speculative" and "extractive" cultivation. In contrast to the Sérère example, this is a type of cultivation where the cultivator, often occasional, is attracted solely by the immediate profit that groundnuts may bring. It is practiced by the group of Murids on the one hand, and, on the other, by the navétanes /seasonal workers/.

S
795 /9/ Muridism (3) is a Moslem movement founded by Sheik

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[113]

3. Pelissier, P. "L'arachide au Sénégal, rationalisation et modernisation de la culture," Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, Vol. IV, 1951, No. 13, pp. 80-85.

Amadou Bamba, who died in 1927. The brotherhood has many adepts, especially in Siné-Saloum near the Ouoloff. For the Murids, Islam is a religion based on renouncement. Agricultural work becomes a holy thing if it is done for the benefit of the pious man who prays. The adepts of Muridism, or talibés, thus

[TEXT continues on P.7--Analyst]

/9 cont./

795 have a moral obligation to deliver the products of their labor to the marabouts. With a remarkable ardor for clearing, these 244 Murids have improved new lands and have thus made a "ground- 311 nut front" progressing toward the east, especially on both sides 795 of the Dakar-Niger railroad. This cultivation, however, presents grave dangers, because the Murids essentially concern themselves with groundnuts at the expense of millet; they use the cleared lands in the average proportion of 60% of the area for groundnuts and only 40% for millet. Crop rotation and fallowing are all too rarely respected, and the lands put under cultivation are all the more unstable since the groundnut front now abuts on the zone of the lateritic cuirasses of the east, ushering in the Sudan.

244 427 [464] [167] [113] The navétanes (4) are the seasonal workers who come

4. Fouquet, J., La traite des arachides dans le pays de Kaolack et ses conséquences économiques, sociales et juridiques /The trade of groundnuts in the region of Kaolack and its economic, social, and legal consequences/. Law thesis, Montpellier, 1951, 262 pp.

from the Sudan in particular and, up to 1958, from the north of Guinea. They cultivate the groundnut for the benefit of [466] the employer, or diatigui, according to the clauses of a ver- [465] bal contract. The employer furnishes the cleared ground, the seed, lodgings, and food. The navétane prepares the land, sows, weeds, and gathers the harvest. Actually, he devotes scarcely three to four half-days per week in work for the benefit of the diatigui. He utilizes the rest of his time for clearing and cultivating for himself. This labor is very costly for the employer, who is often obliged to borrow at prohibitive rates in order to feed the navétane. Moreover, this system presents grave dangers, because the temporary immigrant, clearing and cultivating land for which he feels no attachment,

/24 cont./

439 433 framework of their commercial activities. Moreover, they are especially great consumers of margarine. Belgium /25/ is concerned about protecting its daily herds and, up to now, the products of the Congo. Finally, Italy gives priority to olive oil. In fact the coincidence of the French shortage of oleaginous materials and the largely excess production of Senegal can lead, within the spirit of the treaty and without contradiction, from the common policy anticipated for certain agricultural products (Art. 39) to the definition of the groundnut as a basic French oleaginous commodity, with the formation of a support fund maintained essentially by France. M. Adler concludes: "On the one side there is sought a product that on the other side no one wants" (5).

[113]

5. Adler, J., "Le Mali et l'archide /Mali and the groundnut/," Marches tropicaux, No. 745, 20 February 1960, pp. 497-498.

On the other hand it seems that in the case of union Senegal could anticipate, through the increasing competition between the local products of the six member countries, an appreciable lowering of the price of articles imported from Europe, from which there is a possibility of an increase in the purchasing power of the groundnut producer, in any case assured of getting a stable income from his harvest, except in the case of very serious natural calamities.

In conclusion it seems, as M. Barbier emphasizes, that for Senegal in the present circumstances the policy of bigamy is preferable to that of divorce.

Yves Pehaut.

/372/

369 [361] "Dakar is the only city, in the European (or Western) sense, in all of West Africa," wrote D. Wittlesey in 1941 (1).

[113] 1. Derwint Wittlesey, "Dakar and other Cap Verde Settlements," The Geographical Review, 1941, p. 609.

Things have changed since then; Conakry, Bamako, Abidjan, and other centers have become true cities. It is incontestable [162] that the 230,000 inhabitants counted in the census in 1955, of whom more than 30,000 were non-Africans, make Dakar the [563] most important city in all of the Black Africa of French expression. In 1957 its port had more traffic than all the other ports [505] of former French West Africa; in 1960, 8,000 vessels, with a capacity of 21,000,000 tons (2), put it among the most frequented

2. The official figures are 7,948 vessels and 20,992,111 tons.

[162] ports of Africa. But 50 years ago Dakar did not have 25,000 inhabitants. The rhythm of its growth is thus on a level with that of certain mushrooming cities in the United States of America. Dakar does not owe this extraordinarily rapid development solely to favorable natural conditions, as is often said, but also and especially to a complex interaction of historical, economic, and political factors. It is a crossroads born out of the effective integration of the African world and South America in the European economic system, an integration linked with the search for raw materials and markets, made possible and necessary by the great technical progress realized since the middle of the nineteenth century. City-crossroads, all of its vitality depends on the state of its relations.

[133] 1. Birth of Dakar. The head of the peninsula of Cape Verde, on which Dakar was established, is an assemblage of

/372 cont./

369 plateaus made up of two volcanic systems of different ages,
133 separated by a small, low plain, the whole tilting toward the east-northeast. This head of the peninsula is savagely attacked by oceanic floods which create on these coasts many capes and little bays, as well as some little detached islands not very far away. It is in one of these little bays, the bay called Dakar,
361 the most extensive and the best protected, that the great modern
369 port is located, between Pointe de la Défense and Pointe de Bel-Air (Fig. 1).[1] Incontestably, this head of the peninsula makes a favorable site for a port city, a site whose equal would be sought in vain in West Africa (Fig. 2).[2]

131 /373/ But even more than the site, it is the location of
361 this forward cape of Africa that constitutes a trump of the first
369 order in the cards of Dakar. Crossed by the north parallel 14° 487 40' and located at the center of curvature of the great western bulge of the African continent, almost halfway between the 30th degree north where the desert begins and the regions of the Bénin, former slave-dealers, the peninsula occupied an interesting position in the former navigational system of the central and southern Atlantic, for both the ships coming from the north and those coming from the south. It was in fact chosen as the first place of easy reprovisioning for the sailors who had traveled for several days along a desert-like coast from south of Morocco, while, for the ships coming from the Gulf of Guinea, it was the last place for provisioning available before the Canaries. Moreover, the tip of the peninsula is the most westerly of all the headlands of the Old World. Cape Dunemore in Ireland, which is the most westerly in Europe, does not go beyond 11° west of Greenwich, whereas the peninsula of Cape Verde goes beyond 17° west, even reaching 17° 32' 16" at Cape Almadies. Dakar is thus more than 500 kilometers west of Casablanca (3); it is

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3. Marcel M. Chartier, "Dakar, Port aérien /Dakar, aerial port/," in Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, 1948, p. 87.

[1] [See category 116, p. 5 -- Analyst]
[2] [See category 116, p. 11 -- Analyst]

/373/

369 therefore one of the Old World's closest points to South America
36 (4). Dakar and Natal are about 3,000 kilometers apart.
[131
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4. Cape Roxo and the region of Freetown are closer from Cape St. Roque by 250 kilometers (cf. J. Richard Molard, in "La presqu'île du Cap-Vert /The peninsula of Cape Verde/," I.F.A.N., Dakar, p. 10).

[113]

These advantages of site and location, however, should not make one forget that the tip of the peninsula of Cape Verde did not have easy access. On the one hand, the shallow depths
[133] which border it on its north front caused many shipwrecks, the
369 pillage of which in part supported the riparian populations, and,
175 on the other hand, it did not offer any security for the possible
[579] establishment of a settlement because of the very independent character of the Lébou, who were tightly organized in a gerontotheocratic republic under the authority of the "Great Serigne" (5).

5. Great Marabout.

after being freed from the bondage of the Damel (6) around 1809.

6. King of Cayor.

Thus, one should not be surprised that the actual occupation of the peninsula by France was very late. For a long time the island of Gorée better satisfied the needs of the early navigators. Discovered by the Portuguese at the same time as Cape Verde, in 1444, the island, located off the southeastern cape of the peninsula, was still uninhabited when the Hollanders appeared at Cape Verde in 1588. In 1617 the latter bought it from the chiefs of the coast "for iron and some nails" (7). This island of less than a

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7. Dr. Cariou, note on Gorée in "La

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presqu'île du Cap-Vert,"
op. cit., p. 274

square kilometer nevertheless satisfied a double /374/ /Fig. 1 appears here / concern of the Hollanders, security and commerce: security first for the ships, which could find an excellent anchorage in the bay on the northeast of the island, immediately so appreciated that its excellence -- Goede reede, "the good roadstead" in Dutch -- served to designate the establishment under the name of Gorée (8) in distinguishing

[103]

8. Nora and Ch. Toupet,
"L'origine du nom de Gorée,"
in Notes Africaines, January 1959,
pp. 17-20, I.F.A.N., Dakar.

[113]

it from the other islands of the peninsula; and then, security for the occupants. From this point of view, the insularity would have been a great advantage for the site of Dakar. Finally, with regard to commerce, the island of Gorée, although minuscule, sufficed for barter with the natives of the coast and could well fill its role as a warehouse for products and slaves. As soon as these views were confirmed by the facts, Gorée became the object of competition among the Hollanders, French, and British, finally coming to the French. In spite of this changing of hands, the establishment of Gorée, thanks to the slave trade, /375/ prospered, and around 1845 it harbored more than 5,000 persons. The abolition of the trade, and then that of slavery, around the middle of the century dealt it a mortal blow, bringing about a crisis from which Gorée did not recover. There was indeed an attempt at adaptation to the new conditions, the Goréans trying to make the island a place for commerce with the continent, where the cultivation of the groundnut had already developed, but on this point Gorée could not rival the peninsula. The inhabitants understood it; there were those who encouraged the occupation of Dakar with the idea

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504 369 712 the support point for the whole military organization of the West African coast, was constructed between 1899 and 1902. Some of these accomplishments, such as the north jetty, the extension of the south jetty, and the dry dock, also concerned the commercial port, the construction of which began immediately afterwards and continued from 1903 to 1910. Two new piers were added to the first one, delimiting three docks between the south jetty and the military port, while the outfitting of the platforms was vigorously carried on (9).

9. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar", Annales de Géographie, 1936, pp. 607-671.

[113]

369 648 This phase of the construction of the port was accompanied by a very important act which was to serve as support for the development of Dakar: the transfer in 1902 of the office of the Government-general of West Africa from Saint-Louis to Dakar, which led to the establishment of high administrative offices in this city (Contrôle Financier, Treasury, Public Works, etc.) (10), although the Governor-general, awaiting

10. Morazé, Ch., op. cit., p. 620.

the construction of his palace, was installed at Gorée, where he remained until 1907, an event adding considerably to the accomplishments on the port and which marked the beginning of the prodigious vigor of Dakar (Fig. 3). 7/1

369 [505] As early as 1911 the port registered a tonnage of more than four million tons; it exceeded 5.6 millions in 1913. During the course of the First World War it played a role that greatly surpassed anything that the founders could have hoped for: in 1917, a tonnage of 10.5 million tons. To be sure, the end of the war led to a sharp decrease in the arrivals and departures, [504] but the recovery that followed the war was such that new works for the port soon became necessary. They were done between

7/1 [See Category 116, P.19 -- Analyst]

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1927 and 1933 in the northern zone, where laying out a platform intended for groundnuts was undertaken with the construction of three new piers, one of which was intended for traffic in combustibles. Finally, a maritime wet-dock was installed in the southern zone (11).

11. Coursin (L.) op. cit., p. 278.

Moreover, these new works did not end the construction of the port. Outfitting and new arrangements continued up to the eve of the Second World War and were taken up again immediately afterwards, making the port the complex organ that it is today: /377/ 6,904 meters of quays, of which 2,794 have depths of 20 meters and more, 2,103 meters with depths of 8 to 9 meters, 580 meters with depths of 6.50 to 7.50 meters, and, finally, 1,427 meters reserved for small boats, the total providing quay posts for 31 ships at a time; a water surface of 210 hectares; 682,000 square meters of platforms, of which 53,940 square meters are covered; and, finally, 240,000 square meters of storage space for hydrocarbides (12). These

12. Synthèse de la situation économique de l'ex-A.O.F. durant la période 1948 à 1958, Vol. IV, p. 712. Publication of the Chambre de Commerce, d'Agriculture et d'Industrie de Dakar.

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are the essential elements of the infrastructure of the port of Dakar, which has become a very effective instrument, fully valorizing a favorable location at the crossroads of the heavily traveled maritime routes. Dakar thus receives ships from practically all of the countries possessing a merchant marine; only the flags of Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, and Russia do not wave in the port of Dakar.

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This great frequentation comes about first from the fact

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369 439 504 that Dakar is designated above all as a port d'escale, "a service station," of the tropical Atlantic, provisioning the ships with water and, above all, combustibles; the latter, represented in former times by coal in particular, are now almost entirely made up of hydrocarbides, the export and import traffic of which sometimes represents more than double that of merchandise: 211.1% in 1954, 233.6% in 1955, 186% in 1959.

369 439 487 But, beyond this role as a port d'escale, Dakar thrust ahead as a metropolis, governing a large region. In fact it is via Dakar that food products (rice, flour, sugar, etc.), cloth and thread, industrial products, etc. come in, principally destined for Senegal, Mauritania, and the Sudan, which, in return, send groundnuts, gum, hides wax, etc. to it for export. This situation is the result of struggles in the recent past between Dakar and the old maritime or river ports which shared the light traffic of former times. The construction of the port and modern means of communication with the interior permitted Dakar to eliminate its rivals very quickly. [505]

369 [505] The establishment of Gorée, caught in a crisis since the abolition of slavery, despite the resistance, at first active and then passive, of its municipality (13), has been practically

[113] 13. In the work by J. Charpy (La Fondation de Dakar /The Founding of Dakar/, Larose, Paris, 1958), there is a series of documents on the various aspects of this resistance.

eliminated from the economic circuit since the accomplishment of the great work of the commercial port. Business then emigrated to the continent, while the city went to sleep, losing more and more of its population; from 3,200 inhabitants in 1872, it went to 2,068 in 1891, 1,249 in 1910, 998 in 1921, so that the commune was abolished and attached to Dakar in 1929, and then the entire island was classified as a historical monument in 1944. [162] [633]

/381 cont./
369 larger than that of Paris. In Dakar, this function as a metrop-
648 olis, which has been confirmed since the construction of the
633 commercial port, preceded and conditioned the development of the city.

369 3. The city. The commercial affairs which thus make
166 African products and products from the outside converge toward
167 the Dakar crossroads could not fail to bring with them a great
[487] number of people. First, there are the Goréans, finally resigned to their fate, who accompany or follow the commercial or administrative establishments being transferred to Dakar; then, non-Africans, administrators, technicians, merchants, etc., usually arriving from Europe by the same route as that of the imported manufactured products. But above all there are the masses who arrive by road and by rail, by these paths of a money economy which have greatly disturbed the villagers' traditional institutions and thus communicated to the people a mobility formerly unknown in the rural world. Willingly or unwillingly, the rural people of Senegal, of the Sudan, of Upper Guinea, and of the Upper Volta take to the road and rails to cast themselves into an /382/ /Fig. 3 appears here/ /383/ adventurous existence which will lead many of them to Dakar and to settle there. Finally, Africans from Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Dahomey, students at the large educational institutions and officials who come in connection with the functions of the federal capital, also arrive by sea.

369 This human convergence, which since the last decade of
162 the century has continued to grow, has caused a vertiginous increase in the population. To be sure, for the period before 1955
[633] there were only estimations, all the less certain because the boundaries of the commune have often changed, but the official figures (18), even though they should be corrected here or

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18. Synthèse de la situation économique de l'ex-A.O.F. durant la période 1948 à

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1958. op. cit., Vol. I, p. 35: 1910, 24.000; 1921, 32,000; 1931, 54,000; 1945, 132,000; 1955-56, 231,000.

[633] there, nevertheless give an acceptable idea of the direction of the development of the population of Dakar. The first 20 years that followed the construction of the port were characterized by a not very spectacular progression, the population merely having doubled, going from 24,900 in 1910 to 54,000 in 1931. This relative slowness of growth should undoubedly be attributed to some check due to the First World War, but it is basically explained by the then very imcomplete [496] character of the modern paths of penetration, the railroads from Thiès to Kayes and from Louga to Linguère not having been finished until after the war. By contrast, the progression has been particularly rapid in the 20 years that followed, and, in spite of the checks that would seemingly have been put into operation by the Second World War, the population has more than quadrupled between 1931 and 1955, reaching 230,000 inhabitants at the latter date (19).

[113] 19. Recensement démographique de Dakar 1955. Résultats définitifs, 1er fascicule /Demographic census of Dakar for 1955. Final Results, No. 1/. Publication of the Service de la statistique de l'ex-A.O.F., July 1958. The following figures given for the population of Dakar have been taken from this number or have been calculated from the figures that it gives.

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This Dakar population, very diverse in its make-up, is an almost complete sampling of the ethnic groups of Senegal, to which are added elements from the other territories of former French West Africa and also some non-Africans. Thus, jostling

[Text continues on P. 20--Analyst]

/Fig. 3 Caption cont./

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a-g. The piers. -- I. Town Hall. -- II. Chambre de Commerce. -- III. Sandaga Market (Ponty-Clemenceau cross-roads). -- IV. Former Palace of Justice. -- V. General Postoffice. -- VI. Treasury. -- VII. Kermel Market. -- VIII. Military Circle. -- IX. Residence of the President of the Republic. -- X. Military Hospital. -- XI. African Hospital. -- XII. Palace of Justice. -- XIII. Camp Bornis. -- XIV. Camp Galliéni. -- XV. Station.

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/383 cont./ one another in Dakar are Lébou, Ouolof /Wolof/, Toucouleur /Tukolor/, Sérère /Serer/, Sarakolé, Diola, Socé, etc., who are Senegalese, but there are also Mauritanians, Sudanese, Voltaics, Guineans, Ivorians /persons from the Ivory Coast/, Dahomeans, Cape Verdeans, Lebano-Syrians, French, etc. The Lébou, who are the original population of Dakar, today represent scarcely one-tenth of the population, exceeded in number by the Oulof, the Toucouleur (20), and even by the 30,000 non-Africans,

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20. A. Diop, "L'immigration toucouleur à Dakar (enquête /investigation/ 1958-1959)," I.F.A.N., Dakar, p. 1. The author, citing an investigation by the M.I.S.O.E.S., gives the figure of 31,000 Toucouleur in 1959.

among whom the French constitute a great majority of close to 23,000 persons in residence. This character of Dakar as a [166] region of call is illustrated first by the fact that only a little more than one-third of the population was born there /384/ and then by the quite obvious inequality between the number of men and that of women. Before the war, among the Europeans, there were 65% men as against 25% women and 10% [744] children (21). Today the systematic destruction of the

21. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar," op. cit., p. 630.

/384 cont./

369 in the city at the home of a relative, at the home of a friend
563 or the friend or relative of a friend, or at the home of a resi-
166 dent originally from the same village or merely from the same
162 region -- all of this ultimately makes up the factors that are
464 more decisive than the salary. Because of this, while among the resident non-Africans the number of persons employed amounts to 43 % of the total and 64% of the economically active, among the resident Africans, the proportion of workers is no more than 27% of the total and 42% /385/ of the economically active. If one adds to that the salaries, on the average
369 much higher among the first than among the second, one finds
571 in Dakar some of the contrasts characteristic of West African
563 cities: on the one hand, among the non-Africans, a high standard of living which is often shown in the appearance of their quarters, and, on the other hand, the mass of the African population whose settling in the city is tied neither to a correlative augmentation of the normal opportunities for lodgings nor to a higher living standard in relation to the bush, which gives to the African city, or at least to some of its quarters, an appearance more wretched than that of the villages of the interior.

369 This situation, formerly very clear, put Dakar in the
563 normal category of West African cities, where a white city and
[361] a black city stand in contrast (22), a contrast that was the result

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22. Dresh, J., "Villes d'Afrique occidentale /Cities of West Africa/," Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, 1950.

of a de facto segregation imposed, not by law, but by the norms of urbanism and of hygiene, to which it was impossible for the bulk of the natives to subject themselves, and also by the high
[465] price of rent -- the non-Africans being nearly always lodged by their employers. In 1936 Charles Morazé wrote: "Formerly Europeans and natives lived mixed. Innumerable families lived

/385 cont./

369 563 in small apartments, true caravansaries contained within the European city. This promiscuity was deplorable. Europeans and natives were not in fact subject to the same epidemics; [164] yellow fever, for example, fatal for the white, is benign to the black. The danger of a mixed population was that the epidemics would spread without being stamped out in time. [361] Finally, the system lacked style; therefore as early as 1916 the creation of the native village of Médina was decided upon" (23).

23. Morazé, Ch., "Dakar," op. cit., p. 630.

There it was, in a way, the theory of the urbanism of the West African cities! Nevertheless the problems of land were so complicated at Dakar (24) between the two world wars

24. See the work by A. Angrand, Les Lébou de la presqu'île du Cap-Vert (Essai sur leur histoire et leurs coutumes) /The Lébou of the peninsula of Cape Verde (essay on their history and their customs)/. "La Maison du Livre," Dakar.

[113]

[167] [452] [361] that, with the Lebano-Syrian immigration and the Crédit Foncier /Mortgage-loan Society/ helping, there was created, in contact with the European city and the Médina, a collection of quarters more mixed in their contents and in their appearance. Up to the end of the Second World War Dakar preserved this appearance of a threefold city. But after the war a series of new factors caused a rapid and brutal evolution in Dakar. The return to normal economic activities after the slack period following the war, the awakening and amplification of political and syndical life, the creation of the Fonds d'Investissement Economique et Social (F.I.D.E.S.), and, finally, the ever greater influx of rural people into Dakar led the federal authorities to take a series of fortunate initiatives. /386//Fig. 4 appears here/

/392 cont./

369 condemnation.
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439 Consequently it is necessary to emphasize the same instability of this role of Dakar as a relay-station. Already
[505] strongly rivaled in its function of provisioning ships by such ports as Las Palmas and Santa Cruz of Tenerife (25), better

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25. Nicolas, J. -P., "Les hydrocarbures de soute à Dakar; 2e rapport. Eléments d'information sur la position concurrentielle des îles Canaries, 15 Nov. 1960 /The hydrocarbides stored at Dakar; 2nd report. Data on the competitive position of the Canary Islands, 15 Nov. 1960/," I.F.A.N., Dakar.

located on the direct route between Europe and South America. Dakar is no longer an imperative stop in the tropical Atlantic because of the greater autonomy of the ships in the matter of provisioning. On the other hand, the recent political evolution which has led to the "Balkanization" of former French West Africa has not only broken all the administrative and political ties which were among the most notable elements of the power of Dakar, but it has also permitted at Conakry, Abidjan, and Cotonou other possible relay-stations for the interior regions to become rivals, more and more limiting the zone of influence of Dakar. The recent breakup of the Federation of Mali, completely and at a single stroke turning the traffic between Senegal and the Sudan toward Abidjan in particular and to a lesser extent toward Conakry, is a particularly striking example of the instability of the position of Dakar. In the present state of affairs, nothing remains for Dakar but the Senegalese interior and Mauritania, and this latter country, which is building its own port at Port-Etienne, is seeking to free itself (Fig. 6).

Thus, grave threats weigh on the metropolis of Dakar. In any case, even in the eventuality of a recovery in the